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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 In order to form a contract at least one of the parties to the bar-
gain must give an undertaking or commitment of the appropriate 
kind to the other; that is, he or she must perform a commissive 
speech act of the right kind. It is widely held that the act in question 
is not a technical or distinctly legal speech act, but rather the same 
prosaic act of promising that is the subject of the everyday moral 
practice we learn about as children. Indeed, it is standard textbook 
fare that a contract is a promise (or an exchange of promises) that 
the law will enforce. In this Essay I argue that this orthodoxy is mis-
taken: the commissive speech act by means of which a contract is 
formed is not the same speech act as that by means of which we vol-
untarily undertake moral obligations to others.  
 My principal concern here is the descriptive claim that contracts 
comprise promises. I am not concerned in this Essay with the pre-
scriptive claim of the so-called “contract-as-promise” theorists that 
contract law ought to enforce promises. These theorists hold that the 
proper purpose of the law of contract is to give direct legal effect to 
the morality of promise-keeping.1 Except insofar as these theorists 
purport to draw support for their prescriptive claim from the proposi-
tion that contracts are in fact formed by promises, my argument here 
will leave their theories untouched. 
                                                                                                                     
 ∗ B.Sc., LL.B., LL.M., Ph.D. Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Queen’s University, 
Kingston. I am grateful to Curtis Bridgeman, Andrew Gold, Greg Klass, and Ethan Leib for 
their very helpful written comments on an earlier draft of this Essay. I have also benefited 
from discussion of earlier drafts at three workshops on contract law: at the XXIII World Con-
gress of Philosophy of Law in Krakow, at the Georgetown University Law Center, and at the 
University of Western Ontario Faculty of Law. Thanks to the participants in those work-
shops, and in particular to Helge Dedek, Daniel Markovits, and Seana Shiffrin. 
 1. The classic work in this vein is CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY 
OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981). For a more recent account of contract law in the con-
tract-as-promise tradition, see STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY (2004). 
802  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:801 
 
 The thesis that contracts are promises is frequently assumed and 
seldom argued in the literature. Textbook writers, concerned primar-
ily with doctrine and impatient with close analysis of moral concepts, 
tend to refer to contractual undertakings as “promises” without much 
analysis of the nature and significance of promises outside of the law. 
From their pens, the proposition that “contracts are promises” often 
looks like mere stipulation. Nor do most contract theorists dwell long 
on the question of whether the constituents of contracts are prom-
ises; their primary concern vis-à-vis promising is the different ques-
tion of whether and to what extent contract law ought to be in the 
business of enforcing promises.2 Happily, however, there are excep-
tions. Indeed, one of the most important recent contributions to con-
tract theory is an elegantly wrought paper by Seana Shiffrin in 
which she argues for and lays heavy emphasis on the claim that con-
tracts are promises.3 
 I have chosen to use Shiffrin’s paper as the specific target of my 
general argument that contracts are not promises. Shiffrin’s central 
claims are that contracts are promises, that contract law diverges 
from the morality of promising, and that this divergence stands in 
need of justification.4 After outlining this aspect of her paper, I argue 
that the law of contract is not concerned with promises as such and 
that, therefore, contract and promise do not diverge in a way that 
calls for justification. In the process of making this argument I draw 
certain significant philosophical conclusions about the nature of 
promises and promissory obligations. 
II.   SHIFFRIN ON THE DIVERGENCE OF CONTRACT AND PROMISE 
 Shiffrin’s paper is remarkable for the significance she attaches to 
the proposition that contracts are promises. She argues not merely 
that the proposition is true, but moreover that it has important im-
plications for the content of the central default rules of contract law.5 
This is an uncommon claim. Contracts scholars typically hold that 
the putative fact that contracts are promises may be relevant to the 
rules of contract formation, but that it has little or no bearing on the 
content of postformation default rules, such as those relating to per-
formance, excuse, and remedies.6 The reason for this is that the 
proposition that contracts are promises does not imply anything in 
                                                                                                                     
 2. See, e.g., Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 
1422 (2004). 
 3. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. 
L. REV. 708, 709 (2007). 
 4. See id. at 709. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of 
Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989). 
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particular about the function or purpose of contract law.7 The claim 
that contracts are promises does not, for example, imply that the law 
of contract is animated by a concern with the moral bindingness of 
promises. That the law invokes promises as the exclusive means of 
contract formation does not necessarily bespeak a concern with their 
moral significance. The familiar commissive speech act of promising 
is, after all, a salient and convenient choice as the vehicle for contrac-
tual commitment. Thus one can coherently adopt the position that 
contracts are promises but that the moral bindingness of promises is 
irrelevant to the justification of contract law. Such is the position of 
most utilitarian theories of contract, including those within the law 
and economics tradition.8   
 Shiffrin does not dispute any of this: she does not claim that the 
fact that contracts are promises points to a particular purpose for the 
law of contract.9 Despite this, Shiffrin insists that this fact places 
certain important constraints on the content of the central default 
rules of contract law.10 These constraints are the product of a theo-
retical framework that Shiffrin proposes for assessing the legitimacy 
of any divergence between legal and moral norms governing the 
same activity, including those legal and moral norms that govern the 
activity of promising. 
 Shiffrin’s approach to the relationship between legal and moral 
norms steers a subtle course between two much more established 
veins of thought. On the one hand are those approaches Shiffrin calls 
“separatist,” which hold that the law occupies an independent nor-
mative domain with purposes distinct from those that animate the 
norms of interpersonal morality.11 Separatists insist that these moral 
norms are not themselves a proper concern of the law and therefore 
the law need not be especially concerned about diverging from moral-
ity in its treatment of a given activity.12 In particular, a divergence 
                                                                                                                     
 7. The status of the claim that contracts are promises as largely unchallenged ortho-
doxy doubtlessly owes something to its compatibility with widely divergent accounts of the 
purposes of contract law. 
 8. It is also the position of those who subscribe to both the (Millian) thesis that the 
state may interfere with liberty only insofar as doing so protects against harm, and to the 
view that the moral obligation of a promise is not reducible to a duty to avoid doing harm. 
See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Promises in Morality and Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 916, 934-38 (1982) 
(reviewing P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW (1981)). These theorists hold that 
contractual obligations are triggered by promises in their capacity as reliance-inducing in-
struments of potential harm, but they are not promissory since they are justified by (harm-
based) reasons that are independent of those that support the moral obligation of promises. 
See id. at 923-27. 
 9. Indeed, Shiffrin commits to no particular view of the function of contract law in 
her paper. See Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 720-21. 
 10. See id. at 722-27. 
 11. Id. at 713. 
 12. Id. 
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between the legal and moral treatment of promises raises no special 
concerns for the separatist.13 
 On the other hand are those approaches to the relationship be-
tween law and morality that Shiffrin labels “reflective.”14 Reflectiv-
ists hold that the proper function of the law is to “reflect everyday 
moral judgments whenever possible, whether because this is the na-
ture of law or because, as a matter of political philosophy, it is what 
law should aim to do.”15 Reflective theories of contract hold that the 
purpose of the law of contract is to enforce the morality of promise-
keeping; contract law is and ought to be the positive morality of 
promising, with rules and doctrines that closely reflect the norms 
that govern the everyday moral practice of promising.16 
 Shiffrin rejects both of these approaches in favor of one that bor-
rows insights from each.17 She shares the separatists’ distrust of mo-
rality as a template for the content of legal rules, since these must be 
shaped at least in part by goals and purposes that are peculiar to the 
law as a distinct normative enterprise.18 But she shares the reflectiv-
ists’ view that in working out the rules governing a particular activ-
ity, the law ought to be sensitive to the norms of interpersonal moral-
ity that apply to that activity.19 This sensitivity is called for not by an 
imperative to replicate the content of morality, but by a recognition 
that those who are bound to obey legal rules pertaining to a particu-
lar activity are often also subject to norms of morality that govern 
the very same activity.20 This overlap creates a site of potential di-
vergence between two sets of norms, and thus a potential impedi-
ment to the ability of a moral agent “to lead a full and coherently 
structured moral life.”21 In these contexts the law must ensure that 
the moral agency of its subjects can flourish. “Especially because 
there are moral duties to obey the law,” writes Shiffrin, “legal rules 
should be sensitive to the demands placed on moral agents so that 
law-abiding moral agents do not, as a regular matter, face substan-
tial burdens on the development and expression of moral agency.”22 
Shiffrin expresses this constraint on the law in the form of a basic 
principle: “[W]hen a legal practice is pervasive and involves simulta-
neous participation in a moral relationship or practice, the content 
                                                                                                                     
 13. Id.  
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See FRIED, supra note 1, at 17. Fried argues that “since a contract is first of all a 
promise, the contract must be kept because a promise must be kept.” Id. 
 17. See Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 713-14. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See id. at 714. 
 20. Id. at 714-15. 
 21. Id. at 717. 
 22. Id. at 715. 
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and normative justification for the legal practice must be acceptable 
to a reasonable moral agent with a coherent, stable, and unified per-
sonality.”23 
 From this basic principle Shiffrin derives three more specific con-
straints on the content and justification of divergent legal rules, legal 
rules that govern morally-infused relationships and practices but 
which depart from the relevant moral norms.24 Only one of these con-
straints is relevant for my purposes, namely, that which requires 
that divergent legal rules and their rationales be transparent and ac-
cessible to the moral agent and that they be “compatible with her de-
veloping and maintaining moral virtue.”25 The agent must be able to 
accept some justification (the best one, if not the official one) for the 
divergence between the legal and moral requirements without com-
promising her moral convictions. I call this the “transparency” con-
straint. 
 Having established the transparency constraint, Shiffrin proceeds 
to argue that contract law diverges from the morality of promising 
and that this divergence falls foul of that constraint.26 Shiffrin cites 
several examples of divergence between contract and promise, the 
primary one being the failure of contract law to require parties to 
perform their contracts.27 By favoring damages over specific perform-
ance as the primary remedy for breach, by measuring those damages 
in terms of lost expectancy, and by denying punitive damages for wil-
ful breach, “[t]he law thereby fails to use its distinctive powers and 
modes of expression to mark the judgment that breach is impermis-
sible as opposed to merely subject to a price.”28 This failure amounts 
to a divergence from morality, for “[i]f contract law ran parallel to 
morality, then contract law would—as the norms of promises do—
                                                                                                                     
 23. Id. at 717. 
 24. See id. at 718-19.   
 25. Id. at 718. The first of the other two constraints requires that divergent legal 
rules permit a moral agent to lead “a life of at least minimal moral virtue.” Id. The upshot 
of this relatively weak requirement is that a divergent legal rule must not require an agent 
to behave in a way that is flatly inconsistent with the dictates of morality. The second con-
straint arises not because of the direct effects on moral agency of a divergence between le-
gal and moral rules (and the justifications for it), but rather because of the potentially 
deleterious effects of this divergence (and its attendant justifications) on a culture that 
supports morally virtuous character. Id. The law governing a particular activity must per-
mit moral agents to partake in that activity “without running the risk that their participa-
tion will corrode the habits and expectations associated with moral practice.” Id. at 740. 
Call this the “cultural” constraint. Much could be said about this constraint, which Shiffrin 
deals with at length in her paper. For my purposes, however, Shiffrin’s arguments are of 
interest only insofar as they depend on or seek to substantiate the thesis that contracts are 
promises. Shiffrin’s central claim, and the one tied most tightly to the proposition that con-
tracts are promises, is that contract diverges from promise in failing to compel promisors 
to keep their promises and that this divergence must be justified. Id. at 709. 
 26. Id. at 722.   
 27. Id. at 722-24. 
 28. Id. at 724. 
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require that promisors keep their promises as opposed merely to pay-
ing off their promisees. The only difference is that it would require 
this as a legal, and not merely a moral, matter.”29 
 Shiffrin argues that this divergence between contract and promise 
violates the transparency constraint since it cannot be justified to a 
virtuous moral agent. Consider an efficiency-based justification of the 
divergence, for example. It is often argued that the goal of contract 
law ought to be efficiency, and that this goal is served by prohibiting 
punitive damages and by establishing damages in the expectation 
measure as the primary remedy for breach.30 But the virtuous agent 
must reject any appeal to the idea of efficient breach in justifying the 
relevant divergence, since efficient breach theory encourages agents 
to breach when it would be efficient to do so. This directive places the 
moral agent in a position of acute conflict. “How,” Shiffrin asks, 
“could a moral agent think both that breach of promise is, all things 
considered, wrong and also that it makes sense for us, as a commu-
nity of moral agents, to create a system in which we attempt to en-
courage, however mildly, breach of promise . . . ?”31 
 Shiffrin’s argument that the law’s permissive stance toward con-
tractual breach is incapable of being justified to a virtuous moral 
agent need not detain us any longer here.32 My quarrel is with her 
view that the law’s permissive attitude toward breach stands in need 
of justification in the first place. I argue that, in permitting contrac-
tual breach (subject to payment of damages), the law does not actu-
ally diverge from the morality of promising: there is no divergence 
between contract and promise to be justified. 
 Notice that the fact that the law adopts a permissive stance to-
wards contractual breach does not by itself imply that it diverges 
from the morality of promising. Even if it is established that morality 
requires promises to be strictly performed, the conclusion that con-
tract diverges from the morality of promising follows only on the 
back of the crucial premise that contracts are promises. If this prem-
ise is false, and the law of contract is not devoted to enforcing prom-
ises as such, then its permissive stance toward contractual breach 
presents the virtuous moral agent with no conflict at all, because the 
law adopts no stance toward promise-breaking. If the law does not 
                                                                                                                     
 29. Id. at 722. 
 30. See, e.g., id. at 730.  
 31. Id. at 732-33. 
 32. If the law’s permissive attitude toward breach is to be acceptable to a virtuous 
moral agent then it must be justified in a particular way. Specifically, it must be justified 
by reference to limits on the ability of the law to require contractual performance that are 
due to the nature and function of the law and its institutions, rather than by reference to 
norms (like efficiency) that argue in favor of a permissive stance toward breach by indi-
viduals and institutions generally. Shiffrin argues that no such justification is available. 
Id. at 732. 
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enforce promises, if its concern is not with promises as such, then the 
law cannot be accused of permitting promises to be broken.33 
 The law attaches a contractual obligation to the act of giving a 
particular kind of undertaking to another under certain conditions. 
Like many textbook writers, Shiffrin thinks that the undertaking in 
question is not a technical or peculiarly legal speech act, but just the 
ordinary commissive known as “promising,” the subject of a perva-
sive moral practice and certain familiar moral rules. “Contracts do 
not merely resemble promises,” she writes, they “are embedded 
within contracts and form their basis.”34 I argue in the remainder of 
the Essay that this view is mistaken; the law of contract is not de-
voted to enforcing promises, and therefore, it does not diverge from 
the morality of promising.35 
III.   MAKING CONTRACTS WITHOUT PROMISES 
 Consider Rudy, a self-employed electrician, and Eliza, a home-
owner who recently hired Rudy to do some work for her. A wiring 
fault in Eliza’s home had been causing periodic electrical power 
surges for some weeks, resulting in the destruction of several elec-
tronic devices. An attempt by another electrician to find the fault had 
failed, so Eliza, wary of pouring good money after bad, asked Rudy 
before he began the work if he would promise to fix the problem. 
Rudy, an eccentric, earnest, solitary sort who takes pains to mini-
mize the moral claims others have on him, told Eliza that he was un-
comfortable making promises to his customers and that he preferred 
to make his business commitments by contract alone, leaving the 
morality of promising entirely out of the picture. He said that he 
would fully guarantee his work by contract but that his contractual 
                                                                                                                     
 33. This is not to deny that the law’s permissive stance toward breach may have a 
corrosive effect on the culture of promise-keeping, in violation of the cultural constraint. 
See discussion supra note 25. 
 34. Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 721. 
 35. Shiffrin does not actually address the question of whether contracts are promises 
directly, preferring to focus instead on “contract law’s explicit self-representation of its re-
lationship to promising.” Id. at 721. She believes contract law, saturated with “[t]he lan-
guage of promises, promisees, and promisors,” represents “contracts as resting upon prom-
ises per se.” Id. at 721-22. Despite her emphasis on contract law’s own description of con-
tracts as promises, however, Shiffrin presumably means to imply that this description is 
accurate. Indeed at the outset of her paper she states that “[i]n U.S. law, a contract is de-
scribed as a legally enforceable promise. So to make a contract, one must make a promise.” 
Id. at 709. Her principal thesis is that a virtuous moral agent could not accept any justifi-
cation for the divergence between contract law and the morality of promising. But the 
claim that the law describes contracts as promises can only support the lesser thesis that 
“a virtuous agent could not accept this self-description as accurate while also accepting the 
justification and structure of some of the divergence of contract from morality.” Id. at 722. 
This thesis is far less robust than the one that Shiffrin sets out to demonstrate, for it 
leaves open the question of why a moral agent should take the law’s description of con-
tracts as promises as accurate. 
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commitment should not be construed as a promise. Eliza (who was 
confident that Rudy was not judgment-proof) told Rudy that she 
would be satisfied with an exclusively legal commitment made 
in writing. 
 Rudy drafted an agreement in which he undertook to “locate and 
repair the wiring fault(s) responsible for the recent power surges in 
the customer’s home,” and Eliza undertook to pay Rudy five hundred 
dollars “upon completion of the repairs.” The agreement also con-
tained the following clause: “the commitments expressed herein are 
exclusively contractual. We intend hereby to bind ourselves contrac-
tually to make the payments and to perform the acts specified, but 
we do not intend to bind ourselves morally to do so: these are con-
tractual undertakings, not promises.” Both Rudy and Eliza signed 
the agreement. 
 It is clear that Rudy gave an undertaking to Eliza and that in do-
ing so he made a contract with her.36 Less clear is whether Rudy’s 
undertaking was a promise. I suspect that Rudy made no promise to 
Eliza. Whatever may be involved in its performance, the garden-
variety speech act known as “promising” is not performed by a 
speaker who manifestly denies promising and who disclaims any 
moral obligation to perform his undertaking. If I am right about this, 
then not all contractual undertakings are promises and contracts are 
not properly defined as promises that the law will enforce. 
 Am I correct that Rudy made no promise to Eliza? It is not obvious 
that I am. One might, after all, preserve the orthodoxy that contracts 
are promises by stipulating a definition of ‘promise’ broad enough to 
capture cases like Rudy’s. Consider the definition offered by the Re-
statement: “A promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain 
from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in 
understanding that a commitment has been made.”37 According to 
this capacious definition of promise, Rudy did indeed make a promise 
                                                                                                                     
 36. Daniel Markovits objected that the example of Rudy’s agreement with Eliza pro-
vides no independent support for my thesis that contracts do not require promises. His ra-
tionale is that a person who holds the view that contracts do require promises will simply 
conclude that, by disclaiming an intention to make a promise, Rudy disclaimed an inten-
tion to make a contract, thereby precluding the formation of a contract. But it is too rough 
a gloss on Rudy’s words to say simply that he disclaimed an intention to make a promise. 
Rudy purported to avoid making a promise by disavowing an intention to become morally 
bound by his undertaking. I take it to be clear that Rudy entered a contract despite this 
disavowal; it seems implausible that the law would require a party to intend to assume a 
moral obligation in order to undertake a contractual obligation. The example is intended to 
bring this intuition into relief (though I concede that I offer no substantive account of con-
tractual obligation of the sort that would be required to convince one who does not share 
this intuition). Of course one might share the intuition but still maintain that contracts are 
promises on the basis that Rudy made a promise despite his disavowal. I argue at length 
below, however, that if “promise” refers to a morally salient species of undertaking, then 
Rudy made no promise. 
 37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 (1981). 
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to Eliza. How then shall we determine whether Rudy’s contractual 
undertaking is a promise or whether it is a counterexample to the 
claim that contracts are promises? 
 Notice that the issue here is not whether Rudy’s undertaking is 
properly characterized as a promise under some widely accepted 
definition of that term. Whether a particular act is or is not a prom-
ise is in many contexts a question of substantive morality, not se-
mantics. To assert that so-and-so made a promise is typically to 
claim that so-and-so owes it to another to do what she said she would 
do. Similarly, those who assert that contracts are promises often 
mean to make a claim about the moral significance of the kind of un-
dertakings involved in making contracts. This is certainly true of 
Shiffrin. Her claim that contracts are promises is shorthand for the 
claim that contracts are formed by a species of undertakings that are 
governed by certain definite moral norms, including a norm that re-
quires the promisor to “keep her promise through performance.”38 By 
asserting that contractual undertakings are promises, Shiffrin 
means to underscore their moral salience, and specifically their 
moral bindingness, which is crucial to her thesis that the directives 
of contract law govern an activity that is the specific subject of cer-
tain moral norms. 
 But if promises are undertakings to which certain definite moral 
norms attach, including a requirement that they be performed, then 
contracts are not promises for Rudy’s undertaking does not place him 
under a moral requirement to resolve Eliza’s electrical problem. 
Rudy is not subject to the kind of moral obligation that he would 
have assumed had he given Eliza a morally binding undertaking. 
This is not to deny that Rudy may be subject to certain non-
promissory moral obligations owing to his having entered a contract 
with Eliza. Thus morality may require Rudy to take reasonable steps 
to prevent her from relying to her detriment on a false belief that he 
will complete the repairs. Should Rudy decide not to do the work, for 
example, he may be morally required to inform Eliza of this in a 
timely manner so as to avoid unnecessary prejudice to her position. 
But Rudy is under no moral obligation to complete the repairs (or 
even to attempt to do so) just in virtue of his having undertaken to 
complete them. And this is the crucial point, for if he had made a 
promise (in the sense intended by Shiffrin), then Rudy would have 
acquired a moral obligation to effect the repairs (or to endeavour to 
do so) simply by virtue of having issued the promise. 
 The objection to the claim that contracts are promises, which I 
have been pressing, exploits the fact that at least some contractual 
undertakings generate nothing like the moral obligation to perform 
                                                                                                                     
 38. Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 722. 
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that attaches to the making of a binding promise. Now, one might 
argue that this fact does not refute the claim that contracts are prom-
ises since the moral norms of promise-keeping allow for exceptions 
such that a promise made under certain circumstances, such as 
Rudy’s, will generate no moral requirement to perform. On this view 
promises normally entail a moral obligation to perform, but under 
certain exceptional circumstances, like that of Rudy, they are not 
morally binding. 
 Does this argument from exception rescue the claim that contracts 
are promises? The substantive moral content of that claim, recall, is 
that the law of contract is concerned with a morally salient class of 
undertakings called promises. So the argument from exception can 
succeed only if it can explain how a class of undertakings that in-
cludes some (like Rudy’s) that leave the agent morally free to choose 
not to perform is nevertheless a morally salient class of undertak-
ings. I argue that no such explanation can succeed, but it is useful in 
making this argument to consider how such an explanation 
might proceed. 
 The argument from exception might proceed by claiming that, de-
spite the fact that not all promises are morally binding, those that 
are binding attract obligations of a distinctive kind, and this distinct-
iveness explains the moral salience of promises generally. In particu-
lar, the moral obligations created by promises are voluntary or self-
imposed. They seem, indeed, to be “created by the deliberate choice of 
the individual,”39 and to “arise[] from our mere will and pleasure.”40 
This suggests that promises are governed by a distinct set of moral 
norms, the purpose of which is to empower individuals to create vol-
untary, self-defined obligations toward others by means of a simple 
speech act. Promising is the act of attempting to exercise this norma-
tive power: to promise is to communicate one’s intention to under-
take, by that very act of communication, an obligation to adhere to 
the promised course of conduct.41 Making a promise brings the rele-
vant power-conferring moral norms into play even if some excep-
tional promises (such as Rudy’s) do not succeed in binding the promi-
sor to perform. 
 According to this argument from exception, there exists a distinc-
tive morality of voluntary obligations, a set of moral norms pertain-
ing to those who make promises, that is, to those who communicate 
their intention to assume an obligation. If this argument is sound 
                                                                                                                     
 39. H.L.A. Hart, Legal and Moral Obligation, in ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 82, 
103 (A. I. Melden ed., 1958). 
 40. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 332 (David Fate Norton & Mary J. 
Norton eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2000). 
 41. See J. Raz, Promises and Obligations, in LAW, MORALITY AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 210, 218-19 (P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz eds., 1977). 
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then it might explain how Rudy’s promise is morally salient, that is, 
how it is subject to certain special moral norms despite that it leaves 
Rudy morally free to choose not to perform. 
 But that argument cannot succeed. The problem is not that its 
animating premise about the voluntary character of the moral obli-
gations created by promises is mistaken; to the contrary, the trouble 
is that it does not take this premise seriously enough. The moral ob-
ligations that promises generate are indeed distinguished by the fact 
that they are self-imposed or voluntary. That is what makes them 
special. But what is it exactly that distinguishes an obligation as 
voluntary? Intuition suggests the following answer: a voluntary obli-
gation is one that would not obtain but for the intention of the obligor 
to acquire it. Voluntary obligations are those that depend on the in-
tention of the obligor to take them on.42 Notice what this idea of vol-
untariness entails. An obligation Ox that is capable of obtaining even 
if the obligor intends to acquire some obligation Oy that is meaning-
fully distinct from Ox is not a voluntary obligation. In particular, a 
moral obligation (to do thus-and-so) that is capable of binding an ob-
ligor who intends to acquire a legal obligation (to do thus-and-so), is 
not in any meaningful sense a voluntary obligation.  
 The upshot of this intuition is that a voluntary moral obligation 
can be created only by acting with the intention to create it. So an 
undertaking like Rudy’s that seeks to bind the agent only in law (or 
some other non-moral normative regime) cannot give rise to a volun-
tary moral obligation, regardless of the circumstances under which it 
is made. The argument from exception must therefore be false, for if 
Rudy’s undertaking cannot generate a voluntary moral obligation 
then it has no moral significance whatsoever as an undertaking. Mo-
rality does not have anything in particular to say about undertakings 
simpliciter; there is no such thing as a morality of undertakings, dis-
tinct from the morality of promises. I conclude that not all undertak-
ings by means of which contracts are created are the subject of spe-
cial moral rules, and the substantive moral content of the claim that 
contracts are promises is therefore false. 
 Am I correct that morality has nothing in particular to say about 
undertakings simpliciter, and that it is concerned only with promis-
sory undertakings, that is, with undertakings that communicate the 
intention of the speaker to assume a moral obligation? Beyond an 
appeal to intuition, I have provided no support for this claim. I turn 
now to that task. 
                                                                                                                     
 42. I discuss this conception of voluntary obligations in more detail in Michael G. 
Pratt, Promises, Contracts and Voluntary Obligations, 26 L. & PHIL. 531 (2007). 
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IV.   PROMISSORY INTENTIONS 
 The claim I want to establish is that an undertaking cannot gen-
erate a moral obligation of the promissory variety unless it is given 
with the manifest intention of creating a moral obligation. I call this 
the “voluntariness” thesis. This thesis implies that the morality of 
promising is concerned not with undertakings generally, but only 
with undertakings that communicate the speaker’s intention to as-
sume a moral obligation. Call these “m-undertakings.” If the volun-
tariness thesis is true, then the claim that contracts are promises 
must be false. The substance of that claim, recall, is that the law of 
contract is concerned exclusively with (some subset of) a morally sa-
lient class of undertakings called “promises.” But, if the voluntari-
ness thesis is true, then the only morally salient undertakings are m-
undertakings, and since contracts need not involve m-undertakings 
(as Rudy’s case illustrates), contracts are therefore not promises. 
 I claim that the voluntariness thesis must be true because it pro-
vides the only plausible account of why Rudy is not morally obligated 
by his undertaking, namely: one cannot undertake a moral obligation 
of the promissory variety without communicating one’s intention to 
acquire a moral obligation; Rudy manifestly had no such intention; 
therefore, he did not assume a promissory obligation. What other ex-
planation is available as to why Rudy is not morally obligated by the 
guarantee he gave to Eliza? 
 One such explanation is suggested by an analogy with the law re-
lating to disclaimers of contractual liability. Consider section 21 of 
the Restatement which provides: “Neither real nor apparent inten-
tion that a promise be legally binding is essential to the formation of 
a contract, but a manifestation of intention that a promise shall not 
affect legal relations may prevent the formation of a contract.”43 
 According to this provision, contractual liability does not depend 
on a manifest intention to acquire it, though it may depend on the 
absence of a manifest intention to avoid it. This suggests that it is 
Rudy’s manifest intention to avoid becoming morally bound by his 
undertaking that prevents him from becoming morally obligated and 
not the fact that he did not communicate an intention to morally ob-
ligate himself. I call this the “no-disclaimer” thesis, and I will argue 
that it is not plausible.44 
                                                                                                                     
 43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (1981). 
 44. It is noteworthy that, like the voluntariness thesis, the no-disclaimer thesis also 
amounts to a refutation of the claim that contracts are promises. For if “promises” refers to 
the class of morally significant undertakings, and if morality attaches no force to undertak-
ings that are given with the manifest intention of not creating a moral obligation, then 
Rudy’s undertaking was not a promise; therefore, contracts are not promises. 
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 According to the no-disclaimer thesis, Rudy could have become 
morally bound to perform his undertaking had he not qualified it 
with a disclaimer of moral responsibility, despite that he did not 
communicate an intention to become morally bound by it. The trou-
ble with the thesis surfaces when we ask how the fact that Rudy dis-
claimed moral responsibility for his undertaking implies that he is 
not required to perform it. The fact that Rudy made explicit his in-
tent to avoid becoming morally bound by his undertaking cannot be a 
sufficient reason not to require him to perform it if his undertaking 
otherwise would have bound him to perform. My plea that in doing 
some act, P, I manifestly did not intend to attract a moral obligation 
to do X, cannot justify or excuse my not doing X if doing P is other-
wise sufficient to obligate me to do X. The concept of an obligation 
entails that such a plea must be irrelevant. For a requirement that I 
do X to be an obligation on me to do X it must be the case that my 
aversion to doing or being required to do X is irrelevant to the ques-
tion whether I should do X.45  
 Rudy’s disclaimer does not extinguish a promissory obligation 
that his undertaking would otherwise have attracted; rather, it es-
tablishes that Rudy’s undertaking is not an m-undertaking and was 
therefore morally inert to begin with. 
V.   OSTENSIVE PROMISES 
 It might be objected that if the voluntariness thesis is true then 
Rudy’s disclaimer is superfluous, and yet it is clearly not superfluous. 
Notice that if the voluntariness thesis is true, then the fact that 
Rudy did not intend to undertake a voluntary moral obligation is suf-
ficient to ensure that he did not undertake one, and his explicit dis-
avowal was therefore unnecessary. And yet it seems sensible, indeed 
important, that Rudy issued a disclaimer given his intention to avoid 
a moral obligation. For surely what matters is not whether he in-
tended to assume such an obligation but whether he appeared to in-
tend to do so.46 
 Like the objection based on the no-disclaimer thesis, this objection 
too has a contractual analogue. In England and elsewhere in the 
Commonwealth, the intention to become legally bound is a precondi-
tion of contractual liability. It is often argued, however, that since 
the law employs an objective test of intention this requirement does  
                                                                                                                     
 45. See Kenneth Einar Himma, The Ties that Bind: An Analysis of the Concept of Ob-
ligation 4-7 (Aug. 6, 2007) (unpublished essay), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 924106. 
 46. I am indebted to Curtis Bridgeman for putting this objection to me. 
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not ensure the voluntariness of contractual obligations.47 Scholars 
like Patrick Atiyah, who reject that contractual liability is self-
imposed, cite the objective test as evidence that liability in contract, 
like that in tort, is grounded in the conduct of the wrongdoer and not 
in her intention to bind herself.48 “Every law student is taught from 
his earliest days that contractual intent is not really what it seems,” 
writes Atiyah, “actual subjective intent is normally irrelevant. It is 
the appearance, the manifestation of intent that matters.”49 
 Does the obligation of a promise, like that of a contract, depend 
only on the apparent intention of the obligor to acquire it? I do not 
think so. It is true that if I have no intention of assuming a moral ob-
ligation to do X but I behave in a way that I know or ought to know 
will lead another to reasonably take me to have such an intention, 
then I may be subject to moral and legal censure if I fail to do X. 
However, I would not be guilty of the wrong of breaking a promise. 
Suppose that I am participating in a psychological study of the effect 
of unkept promises on interpersonal trust and my task is to appear to 
make a promise to a friend and then to fail to keep that ostensive 
promise. I utter the words of a promise to my friend in a suitably 
convincing way but without any actual intention of becoming morally 
bound by them (I am merely playing a role in a study).50 It seems 
clear that if I wrong my friend under these circumstances it is not 
because I broke a promise to her, but because I led her to believe that 
I made a promise to her. Upon being debriefed about the context of 
my utterance, she may rebuke me for being deceitful, for abusing her 
trust, or for causing her harm (if she relied to her prejudice on my 
apparent promise), but an accusation of promise-breaking would 
ring false. 
                                                                                                                     
 47. Justice Blackburn put the classic English statement of the objective test in Smith 
v. Hughes:  
If, whatever a man’s real intention may be, he so conducts himself that a 
reasonable man would believe that he was assenting to the terms proposed 
by the other party, and that other party upon that belief enters into the con-
tract with him, the man thus conducting himself would be equally bound as 
if he had intended to agree to the other party’s terms.  
Smith v. Hughes, (1870-71) 6 L.R.Q.B. 597, 607. 
 48. See generally P.S. ATIYAH, ESSAYS ON CONTRACT (1986); see also Brian Coote, The 
Essence of Contract (pt. 2), 1 J. CONT. L. 183, 195-201 (1989); Andrew Robertson, The Lim-
its of Voluntariness in Contract, 29 MELB. U. L. REV. 179, 187-97 (2005); Hanoch Shein-
man, Contractual Liability and Voluntary Undertakings, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 
209-10 (2000). Recall the well-known comment by Learned Hand that “[a] contract has, 
strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent of the parties. A 
contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, 
usually words, which ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent.” Hotchkiss v. 
Nat’l City Bank of New York, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911). 
 49. ATIYAH, supra note 48, at 21. 
 50. This example was inspired by David Owens who suggested a similar scenario in e-
mail correspondence. 
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 Still, the intuition that ostensive promises are, morally speaking, 
no different than genuine promises is a sturdy one. I suspect that it 
results from a failure to distinguish between the content of the obli-
gations that attach to merely ostensive promises and the grounds of 
those obligations. It may be that, having conveyed to you an inten-
tion to obligate myself to do X without actually possessing that inten-
tion, I become subject to the same moral requirement (to do X, say) 
as if I had in fact made a promise. It may be appropriate, in other 
words, that I be treated as if I promised despite the fact that I did 
not do so. An important function of the practice of promising is to 
provide an easy solution to small coordination problems by enabling 
people to provide others with reliable assurances about the future. To 
serve this purpose, the practice must permit one to rely on what, by 
outward appearances, is a promise. Excusing those who act as if they 
intend to make a promise without actually so intending would fur-
nish “Hippolytus with a let-out, the bigamist with an excuse for his ‘I 
do’ and the welsher with a defence for his ‘I bet.’ ”51 It would render 
the practice ineffective. Reasons of this sort might plausibly provide 
moral grounds for requiring of me precisely what morality would re-
quire of me had I actually made a promise. 
 These reasons for binding me as if I promised merely because I ut-
tered promissory words, and regardless of my intention in uttering 
them, do not undercut the voluntariness thesis. Indeed, they affirm 
it. According to these reasons, my words bind me not because they 
constitute a promise but because they are reasonably mistaken for 
one. I am obligated only if I appeared to do something that would 
have obligated me, had I done it. Moreover, since I am obligated as if 
I had promised only if I appeared to intend to obligate myself by my 
words, it follows that I assume a genuine promissory obligation only 
if I actually intend to obligate myself by my words. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 In order to form a contract, at least one of the parties to the 
agreement must give an undertaking of the appropriate kind to the 
other. The requisite undertaking is almost always referred to in the 
literature and in the cases as a “promise,” and the view that con-
tracts are promises is widely held. If “promise” is intended in the 
broad Restatement sense to mean any undertaking or commitment 
then this view is unexceptionable. However, the claim that contracts 
are promises frequently presupposes a more restrictive conception of 
“promise” that renders the claim false. Those (like Shiffrin) who as-
sert that contracts are promises often mean to advance a particular 
                                                                                                                     
 51. J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 10 (1962). 
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claim about the relation between contract law and the morality of 
promising, namely, that both are concerned with the same kind of 
undertakings. I have argued that morality is only concerned with a 
particular subset of undertakings (m-undertakings) and that the law 
of contract attaches obligations to some undertakings that do not be-
long to that subset. As a claim about the moral significance of the 
undertakings that the law of contract is concerned with, therefore, 
the claim that contracts are promises is false. 
 It might be objected that even if some contractual undertakings 
are not m-undertakings, most are, and so it is at least generally true 
that contracts are promises. This objection is not to the point, how-
ever. It may be possible to form a contract by means of an m-
undertaking, and it may even be the case that most contracts are 
formed this way. But even if this is true, the law does not bind a 
promisor to her m-undertaking as such. It is not in virtue of the mor-
ally significant feature of an undertaking that the law regards that 
undertaking as contractual. As far as the law is concerned, it is ir-
relevant that a party intends to undertake a specifically moral obli-
gation. And this is the critical point, for it belies Shiffrin’s claim that 
the law of contract diverges from the morality of promising in its 
permissive stance toward breach. 
 If the morally significant feature of my undertaking is irrelevant 
to the law’s decision to make me liable in contract, then that feature 
is also irrelevant to its decision to permit me to breach my contract. 
That the law allows me to breach subject to payment of damages 
does not, therefore, imply that it takes the view that breaking prom-
ises as such is permissible. In refusing to compel performance of my 
contractual undertaking, the law does not give me permission to 
break my promise any more than it gives me permission to negli-
gently cause you harm, if that is what I undertook by contract not to 
do. The content of the remedial doctrines of contract law reflect the 
law’s assessment of the permissibility of breaching a contract, and 
that is all. 
